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Many opioid control policies target the prescribing behavior of health care
providers. In this paper, we study the first comprehensive state-level policy
requiring providers to access patients' opioid history before making prescribing
decisions. We compare prescribers in Kentucky, which implemented this
policy in 2012, to those in a control state, Indiana. Our main difference-in-
differences analysis uses the universe of prescriptions filled in the two states to
assess how the information provided affected prescribing behavior. We find
that a significant share of low-volume providers stopped prescribing opioids
altogether after the policy was implemented, though this change accounted for
a small share of the reduction in total volume. The most important margin of
response was to prescribe opioids to fewer patients. Although providers dispro-
portionately discontinued treating patients whose opioid histories showed the
use of multiple providers, there were also economically meaningful reductions
for patients without multiple providers and single-use acute patients.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The number of prescription opioids filled in the United States increased by roughly 300% in the first decade of the
twenty-first century (Kunins, Farley & Dowell, 2013), contributing to a similarly dramatic increase in overdose deaths
(Chen, Hedegaard & Warner, 2014; Dart et al., 2015; Rudd, Aleshire, Zibbell & Matthew Gladden, 2016). Although the
total volume of prescriptions has declined since 2010, nearly two million Americans had an opioid addiction in 2015
(Han et al., 2017). Although illicitly imported or manufactured narcotics are now a significant contributor, the epidemic
has its roots in the misuse of prescriptions legally obtained from medical professionals. Thus, a number of policy
responses to the opioid epidemic have targeted prescribing behavior.
Among the most significant policy responses to this public health crisis are state-level prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs). These systems track all purchases of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) scheduled drugs in the state
and were originally designed to identify inappropriate or suspicious utilization, often for law enforcement. Current
programs are designed to influence the behavior of health care practitioners by providing comprehensive and timely
information about patients' prescription histories. Forty-nine states have established a PDMP, and many have strength-
ened their programs over time.
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Historically, most PDMPs relied on providers to take the initiative to access patient prescription histories. Evidence
from several states suggests that when PDMPs are voluntary, provider engagement is low (Haffajee et al., 2015). This
may explain results from several studies, which find no effect of PDMPs on a variety of opioid-related outcomes (Brady
et al., 2014; Jena et al., 2014; Li et al., 2014; Paulozzi, Kilbourne & Desai, 2011). According to the National Association
of Model State Drug Laws, by 2019 more than 40 states have sought to increase provider engagement via “mandatory
access” laws. These policies require prescribers to consult the PDMP in certain circumstances before prescribing opioids
and other DEA-scheduled drugs. Recent studies suggest that such mandates reduce the volume of opioids prescribed
and indicators of misuse (Bao et al., 2018; Buchmueller & Carey, 2018; Dowell et al., 2016; Grecu et al., 2019; Haffajee
et al., 2018; Meinhofer, 2018; Strickler et al., 2019; Wen, Hockenberry, Jeng & Bao, 2019; Wen, Schackman, Aden &
Bao, 2017).
The first comprehensive mandatory access policy was enacted and implemented in Kentucky in 2012. It required
all providers in the state, with limited exceptions, to check the PDMP before prescribing opioids to new patients and
at intervals for continuing patients. In contrast, previous mandates in other states applied only to certain types of
providers or circumstances. Since it implemented its mandate in 2012, Kentucky's PDMP has been held up as a
model program (Shatterproof, 2016). Subsequently, a majority of other states enacted similar laws. Thus, Kentucky
represents an excellent case study for investigating the impact of comprehensive mandatory access legislation on
opioid prescribing.
We examine how this policy altered the prescribing behavior of Kentucky providers compared with providers in
neighboring Indiana, which represents a good counterfactual for Kentucky for several reasons. Both states were among
the top ten in opioid prescriptions per capita in 2012 (Paulozzi, Mack & Hockenberry, 2014). The two states are also
very similar in terms of demographics, economic conditions, health systems, and health insurance coverage during the
period of our analysis. Furthermore, until Kentucky's 2012 reform, the two states' PDMPs and other opioid policies
were quite similar, as detailed in Section 2.
We estimate the policy's effect on the total morphine-equivalent dosage (MED) prescribed by each provider in each
quarter. We find that after the policy went into effect, Kentucky providers significantly decreased MED prescribed
relative to Indiana providers. To shed light on the changes providers made, we estimate the effect of the policy on four
distinct margins: (1) whether the provider writes any opioid prescriptions, (2) the number of patients to whom they
prescribe opioids, (3) the number of days supplied per patient, and (4) the average MED per day.
Our results suggest that providers primarily responded along the first two margins. After the policy went into effect,
there was a 3.8 point decline in the percentage of providers writing opioid prescriptions in Kentucky (relative to the
change in Indiana). Among providers that wrote any opioid prescriptions in a quarter, there was a roughly 16% decline
in the number of patients. Decreases in the days per prescription and MED per day were smaller in magnitude and
sensitive to specification.
There is substantial variation in provider practice style related to opioid prescribing (Makary, Overton & Wang,
2017; Schnell & Currie, 2018; Thiels et al., 2017). To test for heterogeneous policy effects, we sort providers into
quartiles based on their prescribing in the 6 months prior to the mandatory access policy. Like previous research, we
observe substantial variation in opioid prescribing across providers. In our data, prior to the policy change, providers in
the top quartile account for 97% of total MED supplied, whereas, conditional on prescribing, the modal provider in the
lowest quartile had only one patient with an opioid prescription. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the decrease in
the percentage of providers writing any opioid prescriptions was largely limited to low-volume providers. Low-volume
providers experience a five percentage point (41%) reduction in the probability of any opioid prescribing. Among high-
volume providers, the main response to the policy was to prescribe opioids to fewer patients.
A key question is what type of patients were affected. Ideally, increasing provider PDMP engagement will not sim-
ply reduce opioid prescribing, but will result in more appropriate prescribing. Providers who access PDMP records will
be alerted to patients with utilization patterns that are consistent with misuse or diversion. We thus investigate whether
providers targeted their reductions on patients with histories suggestive of high-risk use. We characterize patients using
three mutually exclusive categories. The first consists of “single use” patients who fill a single prescription in a quarter
and none in the following quarter. This utilization pattern suggests post-surgical acute care and is generally considered
low risk. We divide patients who fill multiple prescriptions into two groups, depending on whether or not they exhibit
behaviors consistent with “shopping,” which we define as obtaining opioids from three or more prescribers or pharma-
cies in a quarter.
The results from this part of the analysis suggest that providers target their reductions on those who meet the
shopping criteria. The average provider reduced the total number of patients with opioid prescriptions by 19% and the
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number of “shoppers” by one-third. Providers reduce opioid supply to other patient types by a smaller but statistically
significant amount. Prescriptions to single-use patients fell by 12%. Thus, although prescriptions to “shoppers” were
most affected, the mandatory access policy may have induced a broader “chilling” effect on opioid prescribing.
An important strength of our analysis is that it is based on the “universe” of DEA scheduled prescriptions in
Kentucky and Indiana. By comparison, most of the research on PDMPs uses insurance claims datasets or state-level
aggregate data. Administrative claims datasets are limited to the enrollees of a particular payer, such as Medicare
(Buchmueller & Carey, 2018), Medicaid (Wen et al., 2017), or a private insurer (Haffajee et al., 2018). Our PDMP dataset
includes prescriptions purchased with all insurance types plus cash purchases. The use of cash correlates with measures
of misuse such as doctor-shopping (Cepeda et al., 2013). Not only is our data representative of the entire population but
also the completeness of the PDMP data allows us to account for all of the provider's patients and to conduct a
provider-level analysis. This is important given that the policy is designed to affect provider behavior. With our
provider-level analysis, we are able to not only estimate the overall effect of the policy on opioid prescriptions but also
to investigate in more detail the provider behavior driving the results.
We explore the impact of the provision of a particular type of information—opioid prescribing histories—across the
full distribution of providers. This research complements other recent field experiments that examine the change in
prescribing by providers in response to information. One such experiment provided “peer comparison” information to
providers prescribing opioids at extremely high levels in Medicare; this experiment concluded that such information
had no effect on prescribing and ruled out meaningfully sized impacts (Sacarny et al., 2016). However, a similar
experiment targeting prescribing of antipsychotics to dementia and Alzheimer patients found large decreases in
prescribing, including substantial effects on clinically appropriate psychiatric patients (Sacarny et al., 2018). This
finding echoes our observation that the provider response, while larger among shopper patients, also reduced prescrib-
ing to single-use patients. Finally, a small experiment found that providers who were informed of the overdose death of
an opioid patient prescribed 10% less MED in the following 3 months compared with matched prescribers who were
not informed (Doctor et al., 2018).
2 | PDMP AND OTHER OPIOID POLICIES IN KENTUCKY AND INDIANA
By 2012, both Kentucky and Indiana had well-established PDMPs. The Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic
Reporting (KASPER) system first became operational, with its data available to providers and dispensers, in July 1999.
Indiana's PDMP, known as the INSPECT system, was established 1year earlier, but access was initially limited to state
regulators; providers and dispensers gained access in March 2009. Law enforcement agencies in both states are allowed
to access the data in connection with ongoing investigations. Both systems capture data on prescriptions for DEA
Schedule II–V drugs. During our entire sample period, physicians in both Indiana and Kentucky could delegate access
to the PDMP to a nurse or other employee.
Kentucky's mandatory access requirement was established by House Bill 1 (HB 1), which was passed in April 2012
and went into effect that July. The law requires all providers who are licensed to prescribe DEA-scheduled drugs to reg-
ister with the PDMP and refers noncompliers to the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure. With limited exceptions,
providers are also required to query the PDMP the first time they order any Schedule II prescription (and Schedule III
containing hydrocodone) for a patient and at least every 3 months thereafter. During the period we analyze, providers
in Indiana faced no such requirements.
It is important to note that the Kentucky mandatory access requirement did not change any aspect of the reporting
of controlled substance prescriptions to the Kentucky PDMP. Over the entire sample period, pharmacies reported all
fills of DEA-scheduled prescriptions to KASPER using established procedures, which are unrelated to provider registra-
tion or querying behavior.
Indiana makes a useful comparator for Kentucky due to its similarity on numerous dimensions, including other
policies that might affect the demand for and supply of prescription opioids. The states have similar demographics,
income, and employment over the time period (see Table A1 in the supporting information). They ranked 35th
(KY) and 37th (IN) in physicians per capita (Center for Workforce Studies, 2013). Neither state allowed the medical or
recreational use of marijuana. During the period of our analysis, Indiana did not have a law allowing third-party
prescribing and lay administration of naloxone. In Kentucky, such a law went into effect in June 2013. Neither state
had a “good samaritan law” providing immunity from prosecution for drug possession to anyone who seeks emergency
medical assistance in the event of a drug overdose.
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One difference between the two states is that HB 1 also included a provision regulating pain clinics.1 The law limits
ownership of pain clinics to physicians (though there is a grandfather provision for facilities established prior to July
2012) and a physician with appropriate board certification must be on-site practicing medicine at least 50% of the time.
The law also requires that clinics accept private insurance and prohibits payments from parties other than a patient,
their spouse, parent/guardian, or insurer. Pain clinic physicians are required to complete 10 hours of continuing medical
education in pain management during each registration period.
According to KASPER, between mid-2012, when the policy went into effect, and mid-2015, 24 pain clinics closed.
Although we cannot definitively disentangle the effect of the mandatory access policy from these pain clinic provisions,
previous research using national data suggests that the independent effect of pain clinic laws is minimal and that the
estimated effect of a PDMP mandate is not sensitive to how the analysis controls for such laws (Buchmueller & Carey,
2018; Dowell, Zhang, Noonan & Hockenberry, 2016). Later, we provide several pieces of evidence that suggest that
Kentucky's pain clinic regulations are not the predominant cause of the decline in opioid prescribing in the state.
Horwitz et al. (2018) argue that research on the impact of PDMPs is often hampered by ambiguity about when
exactly programs became operational. From Figure 1, it should be clear that there is no such problem dating when
Kentucky's access mandate went into effect. The figure presents raw administrative data on the monthly number of
requests for KASPER records between 2010 and 2016. The gray bar is at 2012q3, when the mandatory access policy was
implemented. Prior to that, there were 60,000–70,000 requests made per month. Apart from a slight increase in the
2 months before implementation, there was very little trend in the number of monthly requests. The figure shows a
fivefold increase in KASPER requests coincident with the policy implementation. Similarly, the number of providers
registered with KASPER rose from 37% of DEA registrants in June 2012 to 97% a year later (Freeman et al., 2015).
Available evidence suggests that during the period of our analysis, PDMP queries in Indiana were comparable with
pre-period usage in Kentucky (Allain, 2012).
3 | DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 | Aggregate state-level data
Data from Indiana's PDMP begin in the first quarter of 2012; only two quarters before mandatory access went into effect
in Kentucky. Thus, it is not possible with our main data sources to test for parallel pre-trends in the two states. We
address this issue by considering other data sources. Figure 2 presents annual data from the Centers for Disease Control
1The law defines pain clinics as facilities where a majority of patients receive pain medications and either the primary practice component is the
treatment of pain or the facility advertises any type of pain management services. The regulations do not apply to hospital-owned facilities, hospices,
or long-term care facilities.
FIGURE 1 Requests for Kentucky All Schedule Prescription
Electronic Reporting (KASPER) reports, 2010–2015. [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(CDC) on opioid prescriptions per capita and quarterly data from the DEA's Automation of Reports and Consolidated
Orders System (ARCOS) database on MED2 per capita for the years 2006 to 2016.
Both sources indicate that opioid prescriptions in Kentucky and Indiana were trending in a roughly parallel fashion
from 2006 through 2011. The ARCOS series, but not the CDC series, shows a level shift up in MED beginning with
2010q2. This level shift is due entirely to oxycodone, which jumps up in Kentucky and continues a near-linear trend in
Indiana. The timing of the shift in oxycodone shipments to Kentucky coincides with two important events related to
this commonly abused drug.
One is the reformulation of the extended release version of the drug, Oxycontin. Although this change had a large
effect on the demand for oxycodone products and their substitutes, there is little reason to expect a large positive effect
on shipments to Kentucky relative to Indiana. Alpert et al. (2018) show that Kentucky and Indiana had the same rates
of Oxycontin misuse before the reformulation and thus were similarly exposed to it.
The other change that occurred around this time is a major crackdown on pill mills in Florida (Kennedy-Hendricks
et al., 2016). These clinics were widely reported to be a source of drugs sold in other states. Indeed, Interstate 75, which
runs through both Florida and Kentucky, was dubbed the “Oxy Express." Evans, Lieber & Power, (2019) develop a
measure for cross-state comparisons that suggests Kentucky was obtaining considerably more opioids from Florida than
Indiana was prior to the crackdown. Thus, it is very plausible that as the supply from Florida was reduced, the demand
for oxycodone from in-state providers increased more in Kentucky than Indiana.
Table 1 examines trends in aggregate quarterly per capita MED consumption in Kentucky and Indiana using
ARCOS data from 2006q1 to 2012q2. The models in columns 1 and 2 include just an indicator for Kentucky, a linear
trend and the interaction of the two. In columns 3 and 4, we include a second Kentucky intercept to capture the level
shift in oxycodone shipments after the Florida pill mill crackdown.
Using the logged outcome (column 1), the results indicate that in both states, the volume of opioids grew by roughly
8% per quarter over the 7-year period. When the dependent variable is specified in levels, the simpler specification
suggests stronger growth in Kentucky in the pre-period. However, when we include a second intercept for Kentucky
from 2010q2 onwards, we no longer find a difference in the time trends between Kentucky and Indiana. This suggests
that indeed there was simply a level shift in Kentucky rather than different trends over the full pre-policy period.
Table 2 reports difference-in-differences estimates using quarterly MED per capita for 2006q1 to 2013q4, before and
after Kentucky's implementation of the mandatory access policy (but prior to the Affordable Care Act expansions).
Because the implementation quarter (2012q3) is partially treated, we allow its own dummy. In these results, we again
consider the impact of allowing Kentucky a second intercept for the period beginning in 2010q2. Including this,
additional variable does not alter the results in a qualitative sense. The first column suggests that the PDMP mandate
2We converted ARCOS and PDMP opioid prescriptions to their morphine equivalents using conversion factors from the following three sources:
Palliative.org (2016); CMS (2015); Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (2016).
FIGURE 2 Opioid utilization per capita in Indiana and Kentucky, 2006–2016. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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reduced the volume of opioids in Kentucky by 11%. Allowing Kentucky to have a second intercept (similar to beginning
the analysis in 2010q2) increases our estimate of the policy impact to 14%. Similarly, when the dependent variable is
specified in levels both specifications indicate that the effect of Kentucky's PDMP mandate was statistically and
economically significant.
3.2 | Prescription records
Via data use agreements with KASPER and INSPECT, we obtained the states' complete PDMP records. Each record
contains the following fields: encrypted identifiers for patients, providers and pharmacies, National Drug Code (from
which we derive ingredient, strength, and route of administration), number of units, days supply, patient zip code, and
provider location. For most physicians with prescriptions recorded in KASPER, we also know their specialty.3
Our analysis period begins in 2012q1. Though PDMP data for both states are available through 2016, we end our
sample period in 2013q4 to avoid a possible confounding effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Kentucky
3Physician specialty is observed for all physicians who registered with KASPER between 2010 and 2018. In our sample, physician specialty is known
for 96% of Kentucky prescriptions.
TABLE 1 Pre-period trends in aggregate morphine-equivalent dosage (MED) per capita (Automation of Reports and Consolidated
Orders System [ARCOS] data), 2006q1–2012q2
Variable Log Level Log Level
KY 0.143** 37.35** 0.0917** 19.45**
(0.0232) (3.466) (0.0320) (5.067)
KY#Post2010q2 0.0462* 16.21**
(0.0185) (3.366)
Time 0.0840** 15.17** 0.0840** 15.17**
(0.00740) (0.899) (0.00747) (0.909)
KY#Time 0.00748 3.884** −0.00219 0.492
(0.00774) (0.997) (0.00908) (1.220)
2nd intercept for KY No No Yes Yes
Observations 52 52 52 52
Note. Table reports pre-trends analysis of quarterly aggregates MED per capita for Kentucky and Indiana from ARCOS. Models include a
constant (not shown) and end in the quarter prior to Kentucky's implementation of a mandatory access policy. Columns 1 and 3 use logged
outcomes. Columns 3 and 4 include a binary variable for Kentucky 2010q2 to 2012q2. Robust Huber–White standard errors.
∗∗p<0.01.
∗p<0.05.
TABLE 2 Difference-in-differences analysis of aggregate MED per capita (ARCOS data), 2006q1–2013q4
Variable Log Level Log Level
KY 0.116** 23.27** 0.0987** 17.13**
(0.00871) (2.027) (0.0108) (1.423)
KY#Post2010q2 0.0491** 17.73**
(0.0123) (2.120)
KY#2012q3 −0.0141 1.560 −0.0462** −10.04**
(0.00871) (2.027) (0.00588) (1.572)
KY#Post2012q3 −0.111** −22.20** −0.143** −33.80**
(0.00929) (2.155) (0.00672) (1.737)
2nd intercept for KY No No Yes Yes
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64 64 64 64
Note. Table reports a difference-in-differences analysis comparing aggregate quarterly MED per capita for Kentucky and Indiana from
ARCOS before and after Kentucky's implementation of a mandatory access policy in 2012q3. KY#2012q3 corresponds to implementation
period. Robust Huber–White standard errors.
∗∗p<0.01.
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implemented the ACA Medicaid expansion in January 2014 and also established its own marketplace. Indiana did not
expand Medicaid until 2015 and participated in the Federal Healthcare.gov marketplace. Whereas in 2013, a similar
percentage of each state's population was uninsured (14.3% in Kentucky and 14.0% in Indiana), between 2013 and 2014,
the percent uninsured declined by 5.8 percentage points in Kentucky compared with only 2 percentage points in
Indiana (Smith & Medalia, 2015).
A key advantage of PDMP administrative data over other opioid utilization data is that we observe all or substan-
tially all of an in-state provider's outpatient opioid prescribing,4 which allows us to conduct a provider-level analysis. By
comparison, analyses of aggregate opioid supply (e.g., ARCOS data) do not report data at the provider level, and claims
from a subsample of patients (e.g., Medicare data) do not fully capture a provider's prescribing behavior. In particular,
our PDMP data include all cash purchases, which is predictive of other suspicious behaviors (Cepeda et al., 2013).5
Therefore, analyses based on PDMP data yield the maximal insight on how providers respond to mandatory access
policies.
We limit our sample to providers who practiced in Kentucky or Indiana. Prescriptions filled in Kentucky and
Indiana but written by out-state providers are disregarded because those providers are subject to other states' opioid
regulations. Our main analyses are done on a balanced panel consisting of quarterly observations of providers who
wrote at least one opioid prescription in any quarter between 2012q1 and 2013q4.
3.3 | Hypotheses and outcome measures
There are several possible provider responses to a PDMP use mandate. The requirement that providers have an active
account and check the database before prescribing opioids introduces fixed compliance costs. Some providers may cease
prescribing opioids altogether rather than bear the cost associated with learning to navigate the system. Therefore, we
test whether the policy induced a change on the extensive margin of writing any opioid prescriptions in a quarter.
Fundamentally, PDMPs are designed to alert providers to possible doctor shopping and other suspicious patterns of
patient behavior. Previous research based on Medicare claims data finds that mandatory access policies significantly
reduce the number of patients receiving prescriptions from multiple providers and the number of “new patient” visits
(Buchmueller & Carey, 2018). Thus, we hypothesize that among providers who continue to prescribe opioids, the
strongest effect of a mandatory access policy will be on the number of patients to whom they prescribe.
It is possible that a provider encountering a PDMP report that suggests a patient is overusing opioids may not refuse
to prescribe to that patient, but rather will write a weaker prescription in hopes of weaning the patient off high-dosage
or chronic opioid use. Additionally, the mandate may indirectly affect prescribing intensity. In a survey of Kentucky
prescribers, roughly three quarters of respondents said they believed they were being more closely monitored after the
policy went into effect (Freeman et al., 2015). This perception may have led some to prescribe more conservatively. And
checking the PDMP more often may affect prescribing intensity by raising the salience of safe prescribing practices. We
analyze two measures of prescribing intensity: days supplied per patient and the average MED per day.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for these outcomes aggregated to the provider×quarter level. In the pre-period
(2012q1 and 2012q2), the percentage of providers prescribing any opioids was identical in Indiana and Kentucky (74%).
Conditional on prescribing opioids, the average Kentucky provider prescribed to more patients (60.2 vs. 54.5). MED per
provider is higher in Kentucky because of the difference in the number of patients; the baseline means for days/patient
and MED/day were essentially identical in the two states. Figure 3, which presents the provider-level distribution of log
MED prescribed for the pre-period, also indicates that prescribing patterns were quite similar in the two states before
Kentucky's policy change.
After the policy change, the number of Indiana providers writing any opioid prescriptions increased by 2 percentage
points, whereas the percentage in Kentucky fell by 2 points. The number of patients per provider fell in both states, but
4KASPER and INSPECT capture about 95% of the total MED shipped to a state (as reported by ARCOS) or about 95% of all prescriptions filled in the
state (as reported by the CDC). We expect the PDMP to capture less than 100% of the ARCOS volume, which includes opioids administered to
hospital inpatients (not reported to PDMPs). The CDC data are based on a sample of retail pharmacies; the CDC does not give detailed information
about its methods.
5Although our PDMP datasets always report prescriptions purchased with cash, information on the source of payment is not available in Kentucky
until 2015. In 2015, after both states had expanded their Medicaid programs, 8% of prescriptions in KASPER and 10% of INSPECT prescriptions were
purchased with cash. Prior to Medicaid expansion, 14% of Indiana's prescriptions were purchased with cash.
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more so in Kentucky (−6.1 vs. −2.4). There was essentially no change in either intensity measure in either state.
Overall, the mean MED per provider fell by 9.4% in Kentucky and by 0.4% in Indiana.
4 | ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
4.1 | Overall impact of Kentucky's mandatory access provision
We estimate the overall impact of Kentucky's mandatory access policy in a difference-in-difference framework. Our
estimating equation is
Y jit = α






it , j=1,2,3,4, ð1Þ
where i indexes providers, t indexes calendar quarters, and the j superscript indexes the four distinct decisions that
providers make regarding opioids: whether to write any opioid prescriptions; the number of patients; days supply per
patient; and MED per day. The product of these four outcomes is the total MED prescribed by a provider in a quarter.
The policy variable, KYpost, equals 1 for Kentucky providers beginning in 2012q4 and 0 elsewhere; Kentucky's
partially treated implementation quarter, 2012q3, is accounted for with its own dummy variable. Because the data from
both states include encrypted provider identifiers, we are able to condition on provider fixed effects (δi). Our models
also include quarter fixed effects (δt). We cluster εit at the provider level. With only two states, asymptotics for
FIGURE 3 Distribution of logged (Base 10) total morphine-
equivalent dosage (MED) prescribed by provider, 2012h1 (0 mapped
to −0.5). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 3 Sample means of quarterly provider-level outcomes
Indiana Kentucky Kentucky
All prescribers All prescribers Excl. pain mgmt.
Outcome Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
MED (1000s) 56.1 55.9 −0.2 62.6 56.7 −5.9 49.2 41.8 −7.5
Any prescription 0.74 0.76 0.02 0.74 0.72 −0.02 0.74 0.72 −0.02
Unique patients | Any 54.5 52.1 −2.4 60.2 54.2 −6.1 56.4 49.5 −6.9
Days/patient | Any 18.5 18.6 0.1 18.9 19.3 0.4 18.4 18.8 0.4
MED/day | Any 35.6 35.5 −0.1 34.6 34.3 −0.3 34.4 34.1 −0.3
Note. This table reports means of quarterly provider-level measures based on PDMP data. The column marked “pre” refers to 2012q1 &
2012q2; the column marked “post” refers to 2012q4 through 2013q4. The first set of columns reports on all prescribers in Indiana, the second
on all prescribers in Kentucky, and the third on Kentucky prescribers excluding pain management specialists.
Abbreviation: MED, morphine-equivalent dosage.
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consistency will not apply if standard errors are clustered at the state level. However, clustering at the provider level
will account for much of the serial autocorrelation in errors, which is the main concern that Bertrand et al. (2004)
identify for difference-in-differences models. We explore inference under two alternative models in Section 4.B.
Y1 is an indicator variable that equals one if a provider wrote at least one prescription in the quarter and zero other-
wise. Because of the fixed effects, we specify this equation as a linear probability model. For the continuous outcomes,
we report two sets of models, one with the dependent variable in levels, the other in natural logs. As shown in Figure 3,
the distribution of MED prescribed by providers in the pre-period appears to be approximately lognormal. Intuitively,
we expect the policy to have a proportional effect on the number of patients, which points to the log model as the pre-
ferred specification. For the other continuous outcomes, it is less clear a priori whether logs or levels should be pre-
ferred. Tests for model specification recommended by Deb et al. (2017) suggest that the log model fits our data better
for all three continuous outcomes.
In addition to the basic difference-in-differences specification, we also estimate an event study version of the model
in which an indicator variable for Kentucky is interacted with each time dummy. Because we have a very short
pre-period, we rely on the previous analysis of ARCOS and CDC data to provide evidence on pre-period trends. We pri-
marily use this specification to confirm that the estimated treatment effect coincides with the quarter when HB 1 was
implemented and to examine the dynamics of the treatment effect in the post-period.
The event study results are presented graphically in Figure 4. Each of the four variables exhibits a sharp decline in
2012q3 relative to the previous quarter, with the full impact realized by 2012q4. The fact that the movement in the
variables is so tightly linked to the policy timing is reassuring. The pattern in these event studies—a sharp change in
prescribing behavior followed by parallel trends in the post-period—is well-captured by a difference-in-differences
framework.
FIGURE 4 Provider-level prescribing behavior: event study, 2012q1–2013q4. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Table 4 reports difference-in-differences regressions for each of our four outcomes. The first column indicates that
mandatory access reduced the probability of any opioid prescribing by nearly 4 percentage points. This significant effect
on the extensive margin is consistent with the hypothesis that fixed compliance costs may have led some providers
to stop prescribing scheduled drugs altogether. We provide further support for the fixed-cost hypothesis in the
next section.
We hypothesize that requiring providers to check a PDMP before prescribing opioids will have the strongest effect
on the number of patients receiving prescriptions. The regression results indicate a large provider response along this
margin. The log specification implies that among providers writing any opioid prescriptions in a quarter, Kentucky's
mandatory access policy reduced the number of patients by 16% (exp(−0.177) − 1 = −0.162). Specifying the model as
linear in levels also yields a significant policy effect, though, relative to the sample mean, the percent effects are
slightly smaller (−11%). The results for Y1 and Y2 can be combined to estimate the total effect on the number of
patients treated using standard methods for two-part models (Deb et al., 2017). Because the change in the extensive
margin was concentrated among very low volume providers, the reduction in the number of patients among providers
writing any opioid prescriptions in a quarter accounts for roughly 95% of the total decline in the number of patients
per provider.
Estimated effects for the average days per patient and MED per day are smaller and more sensitive to specification.
In the log model, the mandatory access policy is estimated to reduce days per patient by 4%, whereas the levels model
implies essentially no change. Similarly, for MED per day, the log model implies a statistically significant 3% to 4%
reduction, whereas the corresponding levels model implies smaller and less precisely estimated reductions. As noted,
any effects on these margins are likely to be indirect. The changes observed for these outcomes may also reflect a
change in the composition of patients receiving opioids after the policy change. As we show below, the effect of the
policy on the patient margin was strongest for patients who filled multiple prescriptions. Reducing the number of high-
use patients will have the effect of also reducing measures of prescribing intensity. Because of this and the sensitivity of
the estimates to specification, we are reluctant to conclude that providers responded to the policy by reducing the
number of days or MED per day.
We calculate the overall effect on MED supplied by combining the estimates from our four outcomes, which can be
multiplied to yield total MED. When the outcome variables are in levels, we find a 10.2% reduction in MED after the
policy in Kentucky relative to Indiana. Our estimate is in line with the simple comparison of sample means, which
implies a 9% reduction, and the ARCOS regressions, which imply a 10%–14% reduction. We find a somewhat larger
impact when we specify the dependent variables in logs, but the log model is not ideal for calculating the overall effect
TABLE 4 Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Kentucky's mandatory access Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
(PDMP) law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Any prescription Patients Days/patient MED/day
Results with dependent variables 2–4 in logs
KYPost −0.0377** −0.177** −0.0409** −0.0343**
(0.00379) (0.00913) (0.00536) (0.00513)
Observations 290,464 215,409 215,328 215,328
Number of providers 36,308 36,308 36,294 36,294
Mean of LHS in KY pre (levels) 0.739 60.20 18.85 34.61
Treatment effect in levels −0.0377 −10.73 −0.805 −1.211
Results with dependent variables 2–4 in levels
KYPost −0.0377** −6.466** −0.0334 −0.418*
(0.00379) (0.607) (0.113) (0.187)
Observations 290,464 215,409 215,328 215,328
Number of providers 36,308 36,308 36,294 36,294
Note. Table reports difference-in-difference coefficients from estimation of Equation 1 on a panel of quarterly provider-level measures 2012q1
to 2013q4. Outcomes in second, third, and fourth column are conditional on the provider having any prescribing in the quarter. Outcomes in
the third and fourth column are further conditional on having information on days supply. Standard errors clustered at provider level.
Abbreviation: MED, morphine-equivalent dosage.
∗∗p<0.01.
∗p<0.05.
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on MEDs. The calculation with the log model requires retransformation to levels, which can be inaccurate if there is
treatment effect heterogeneity because of the Duan smearing factor (Deb et al., 2017).6
4.2 | Robustness and specification checks
Because Kentucky implemented its mandatory access policy near the time when it implemented regulations on pain
clinics, our difference-in-difference estimates could be driven by the pain clinic regulation. To examine this possibility,
we isolate the group of physicians most likely to be affected by pain clinic regulation using the information on special-
ties that we observe for Kentucky physicians. In the third set of columns in Table 3, we report the pre- and post-period
averages for Kentucky physicians in general and excluding the roughly 1% reporting a pain management specialty. The
pre-post differences for each variable are weakly greater in the sample that excludes pain management specialists. This
is the opposite of the pattern we would expect if pain clinic regulation is the cause of our estimates.
One advantage of the fact that the two states we analyze are neighbors is that they are more likely to be subject to
similar economic shocks. At the same time, there are possible disadvantages. A significant population center, Louisville,
lies close to the Indiana border, giving rise to a region known as “Kentuckiana." To the extent that some Kentucky
patients respond to the PDMP mandate by seeking prescriptions in Indiana, our estimates will be biased away from
zero, representing the combined effect of a decrease in prescriptions in the treatment state and an increase in the con-
trol state.
To test the sensitivity of our results to border-crossing, we re-estimated all models on two subsets. The first excludes
all counties in either state along the Kentucky–Indiana border, and the second further excludes all counties along any
Kentucky border. Results from this robustness check are reported in Table 5. The results are statistically indistinguish-
able from the full sample result and nearly the same to the hundredth place. Although cross-border contamination need
not be limited to the counties that lie along the border, we are reassured by the fact that the results are so similar when
excluding the individuals for whom border effects are likely to be largest.
6We note that the 10% overall reduction is not inherently inconsistent with the 16% decrease in the number of patients estimated by the log model.
The log model measures the average change in logs, which corresponds to the average percentage change across providers. The log model weights the
percent change from a low volume prescriber the same as the percent change from a high volume prescriber.
TABLE 5 Impact of excluding providers in border counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any prescription Ln patients Ln days/patient Ln MED/day
All providers
KYPost −0.0377** −0.177** −0.0409** −0.0343**
(0.00379) (0.00913) (0.00536) (0.00513)
Observations 290,464 215,409 215,328 215,328
Number of providers 36,308 36,308 36,294 36,294
No KY-IN border counties
KYPost −0.0415** −0.177** −0.0497** −0.0293**
(0.00446) (0.0107) (0.00637) (0.00592)
Observations 228,672 171,221 171,155 171,155
Number of providers 28,584 28,584 28,572 28,572
No KY-IN border counties, no KY border counties
KYPost −0.0398** −0.186** −0.0491** −0.0303**
(0.00523) (0.0130) (0.00749) (0.00696)
Observations 203,304 152,736 152,692 152,692
Number of providers 25,413 25,413 25,408 25,408
Note. The first panel repeats the analysis of Table 4. The next panel excludes all providers located in a county on the Indiana–Kentucky
border (in either state). The next panel excludes all providers located in a county on the Indiana–Kentucky border as well as any other
Kentucky border county.
Abbreviation: MED, morphine-equivalent dosage.
∗∗p<0.01.
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Another issue with analyzing only two states (neighbors or not), is that asymptotics for consistency will not apply if
standard errors are clustered at the state level. As a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our inferences, we follow
the suggestion of Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the data to create a single pre- and post-period observation for each
provider, to account for residual serial correlation in the errors. Results from this exercise are reported in Table A2 in
the supporting information. Estimating the model on this data set yields similar point estimates and standard errors
that are roughly 30% larger than those obtained using quarterly data. For the extensive margin of prescribing any opi-
oids (Y1) and the number of patients (Y2), this difference does not qualitatively change our inferences: the estimates
remain statistically significant at the 1% level.
In addition, we conduct an exercise recommended by Donald and Lang (2007) to assess whether we are
overrejecting the null hypothesis of no effect. They suggest estimating the difference-in-differences coefficient for every
consecutive two periods within the sample period. If standard errors are severely underestimated, these placebo tests
will return statistically significant results. Table A3 in the supporting information implements this exercise, reporting
the coefficients and t-statistics for all four outcomes across all seven possible two-quarter intervals. Our implementation
period is 2012q3, and the two regressions that include that period are bolded for reference. The placebo regressions are
generally, though not always null. However, thet-statistics for the implementation period average more than five times
the t-statistics for the placebo tests. This suggests that even if the standard errors are somewhat too large, inference is
likely to be robust to smaller standard errors.
4.3 | Heterogeneity across providers by pre-period prescribing volume
We hypothesize that the Kentucky law had different impacts for higher and lower volume providers. Low-volume pro-
viders may be most reluctant to pay the costs of mandatory access compliance, because opioid prescribing is not critical
to their practice. Additionally, low-volume providers may not be sufficiently familiar with opioid prescribing histories
to confidently interpret a PDMP record (Carey et al., 2018). Thus, we expect that low-volume providers are more likely
than high-volume providers to stop prescribing.
It is less obvious which types of providers will reduce the number of patients the most. High-volume providers treat
hundreds of patients every quarter and are more likely to be pain specialists. Because chronic pain patients are at high
risk for opioid misuse, pain specialists may be most likely to learn of suspicious behavior when they begin using the
PDMP. On the other hand, these providers may already use the PDMP prior to the mandatory access provision. And of
course, some high-volume providers may engage in illicit opioid distribution, and thus may be insensitive to the infor-
mation contained in the PDMP.
To estimate heterogeneous policy effects by volume, we divide the provider sample into quartiles based on the total
MED prescribed in the 6months before Kentucky's policy went into effect. Table 6 provides summary statistics on pro-
viders in each quartile. All of the outcome variables that we analyze increase monotonically across the quartiles, with
the differences being most pronounced for the number of patients treated. The first quartile is made up of infrequent
TABLE 6 Provider-level outcomes by pre-period provider volume
All Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Total MED in 2012H1 (000s):
Minimum 0 0 0.136 3.652 31.024
Maximum 14,639 0.135 3.652 31.022 14,639
Average quarterly outcomes in pre-period:
Any prescriptions in quarter: mean (%) 73.9 12.1 85.0 98.7 99.8
Number of patients: mean 41.9 0.17 4.7 35.4 127.4
Percent single use (%) 29 61 51 47 23
Percent multiple use non-shoppers (%) 57 29 36 38 63
Percentmultiple use shoppers (%) 14 9 12 15 13
Days per patient 18.6 5.83 9.9 12.3 33.7
MED per day 35.2 14.73 28.9 34.7 43.5
Note. This table reports means of pre-period provider-level measures by provider volume quartile, based on MED prescribed in pre-period
(2012h1.) Sample statistics correspond to quarterly averages in in the pre-period.
Abbreviation: MED, morphine-equivalent dosage.
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prescribers. Only 12% wrote an opioid prescription in each quarter in the pre-period and the modal provider who did so
had only one patient. Conditional on prescribing, mean days per patient and MED per day are low for providers in
quartile 1 relative to other providers. This is consistent with lower-volume providers treating opioid-naive patients with
short-term pain. Quartiles 2 and 3 differ mainly in terms of the number of patients to whom opioids are prescribed.
Quartile 4 appears to include many pain specialists. The average provider in this quartile prescribes to a high number
of patients and writes prescriptions with longer durations.
For each quartile, we estimate a separate set of regressions. These results are reported in Table 7, the first column of
which repeats the full sample results from Table 4. For brevity, we report only the log models for the continuous out-
comes, and show the level models in Table A4 in the supporting information.
The first panel reports the effect of mandatory access on the probability of writing any opioid prescriptions in a
quarter. We find that the lowest-volume prescribers are 5 percentage points less likely to write a prescription due to the
policy change. Relative to the pre-period mean, this is a 41% decline. The estimated coefficient is slightly larger for quar-
tile 2, though in percentage terms the effect is smaller. The vast majority of providers in quartile 3 and 4 continue to
prescribe after the policy change.
The results by provider quartile support the hypothesis that low-volume providers view the fixed costs of mandate
compliance as excessive relative to the benefits. As a further test of the fixed cost hypothesis, we also examine whether
the number of providers who never again write an opioid prescription increases. The results, reported in Table A5 in
the supporting information, suggest that Kentucky's access mandate did lead low-volume providers to “exit the
TABLE 7 Difference in differences estimates by provider quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Total MED 2012 H1 0+ 0–135 136–3652 3652.5–31022 31024+
Any prescription
KYPost −0.0377** −0.0533** −0.0644** −0.0232** −0.00957**
(0.00379) (0.00892) (0.00729) (0.00472) (0.00311)
Observations 290,464 72,696 72,536 72,616 72,616
Number of providers 36,308 9,087 9,067 9,077 9,077
Mean of LHS in KY pre (levels) 0.739 0.129 0.850 0.989 0.998
Ln patients
KYPost −0.177** −0.0824+ −0.180** −0.190** −0.167**
(0.00913) (0.0470) (0.0189) (0.0150) (0.0148)
Observations 215,409 24,264 51,585 68,426 71,134
Number of providers 36,308 9,087 9,067 9,077 9,077
Mean of LHS in KY pre (levels) 60.20 1.329 5.251 35.85 142.1
Ln days/patient
KYPost −0.0409** −0.00134 −0.0616** −0.0505** −0.0183**
(0.00536) (0.0460) (0.0133) (0.00844) (0.00683)
Observations 215,328 24,217 51,559 68,421 71,131
Number of providers 36,294 9,073 9,067 9,077 9,077
Mean of LHS in KY pre (levels) 18.85 5.659 10.04 12.50 34.98
Ln MED/day
KYPost −0.0343** −0.167** −0.0542** −0.0340** −0.00802
(0.00513) (0.0580) (0.0134) (0.00738) (0.00553)
Observations 215,328 24,217 51,559 68,421 71,131
Number of providers 36,294 9,073 9,067 9,077 9,077
Mean of LHS in KY pre (levels) 34.61 16.69 29.95 35.03 40.68
Table reports difference-in-difference coefficients from estimation of Equation 1 on a panel of quarterly provider-level measures 2012q1 to
2013q4 by quartile of provider MED in 2012h1. Outcomes in second, third, and fourth panel are conditional on the provider having any pre-
scribing in the quarter. Standard errors clustered at provider level.
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market.” We find that high-volume Kentucky prescribers are not more likely to cease prescribing than their Indiana
counterparts. This is further evidence that the closure of pain clinics is not the main driver of our results.
Among providers who continue to prescribe opioids, there is a substantial decline in the number of patients by
between 15% and 17% for providers in quartiles 2 through 4. For providers in the first quartile, the log-linear model
implies a smaller percent decline (8%), and the linear model indicates no significant change. A weak effect for the low-
est volume providers is not surprising given that for this group, the bulk of the variation is at the extensive margin.
Results for the two measures of prescribing intensity, days per patient and MED per day, are reported in the bottom
two panels. As in the full sample analysis, these results are mixed, providing less clear evidence for an effect of the pol-
icy. Effects on log days per patient are absent for the lowest volume providers, who already write very short duration
prescriptions, and small for the highest volume providers. When measured in levels, none of the estimates are statisti-
cally significant. The magnitude of the effect sizes for the natural log of MED per day is monotonically decreasing.
Among providers in the fourth quartile, who account for the vast majority of all opioid prescriptions, we see no signifi-
cant reduction in MED per day.
4.4 | Prescribing reductions by patient type
The goal of PDMPs is to alert providers to possible drug-seeking and other indicators of high-risk use. We now examine
whether providers target reductions on patients with suspicious opioid histories that would be revealed in PDMP
records. We are also interested in whether providers reduce prescribing to patients without suspicious behaviors. Such a
finding would suggest that mandatory access was associated with a general chilling effect, which potentially could have
inhibited clinically appropriate prescribing.
To provide insight on how different types of patients were affected by the policy, we define three mutually exclu-
sive patient types. In contrast to our prescriber volume quartiles, which are defined using only pre-period data, we cat-
egorize patients contemporaneously because many obtain a prescription in only a single quarter. “Single use” patients
fill a single prescription in a quarter and none in the following quarter. As shown in Table 6, in the pre-period, 29%
of the average provider's patients (about 12 patients) were single-use patients. Among patients observed filling multi-
ple prescriptions we distinguish between “shoppers” and “non-shoppers.” Shoppers are defined as patients who
receive prescriptions from three or more providers or fill prescriptions at three or more pharmacies in a given quar-
ter.7 In the pre-period, 6% of patients in either state meet our definition of “shoppers.” However, because these
patients appear in the patient pools of multiple providers, roughly 14% of each provider's patients meet the standard,
as is reported in Table 6. Individuals exhibiting shopping behavior comprised a similar share of providers' patient set
across the volume quartiles. However, because high-volume providers account for the bulk of all prescriptions, most
shoppers (more than two-thirds) obtain opioids from these prescribers. The most common consumption pattern was
filling multiple prescriptions but not meeting our shopping criteria. Presumably, many of these individuals are chronic
pain patients.
We use our categorization to examine whether providers targeted reductions in opioid prescriptions on high risk
patients. For simplicity, we report for each patient type an overall effect on the number of patients that combines the
effect on any prescribing (extensive margin) and the effect on the number of patients (intensive margin Deb et al.,
2017).
Table 8 reports estimated policy effects by patient type, as well as bootstrapped standard errors (Belotti et al., 2015).
Consistent with the goal of the policy, the effect of the policy was largest in percentage terms for shoppers and smallest
for single-use patients. The average provider prescribed to 2.6 fewer shoppers, which represents a 34% effect. Reductions
in prescribing to shopping patients are exactly what we expect from the provision of PDMP information; without a
PDMP, it is difficult for a provider to observe prescriptions written by other providers.
However, there are meaningful declines for the other patient types. A 17% decline in non-shopping patients, and a
12% decline in single-use patients is consistent with providers imperfectly targeting the reductions in patients. It is pos-
sible these patients were adversely affected by a chilling effect. At the same time, the PDMP may include other
7Most analyses of opioid misuse define measures of multiple use of providers and pharmacies over a longer period, such as a 6 months or a year
(Buchmueller & Carey, 2018; GAO, 2011; Jena et al., 2014). We use a quarterly measure to investigate whether patterns consistent with provider and
pharmacy shopping change shortly before compared to after the policy change. Of the patients who obtain a prescription from 3+ providers in a
quarter, roughly three quarters obtain prescriptions from four or more providers in a year.
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information suggesting that an opioid prescription would be contraindicated, such as prescriptions for benzodiazepines
(Dasgupta et al., 2016). The number of patients with overlapping claims for opioids and benzodiazepines fell by 5% in
Kentucky after the mandatory access policy went into effect, whereas there was no change in Indiana.
5 | DISCUSSION: STUDY LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS
It is important to acknowledge several possible limitations of our analysis. With any analysis that focuses on a single
state, questions can be raised about the external validity of the particular “case study.” We first consider whether the
policy that is being examined representative of an approach that other states might adopt. Kentucky was the first state
to implement a comprehensive PDMP mandate and shortly after its law went into effect other states enacted similar
legislation. Whether the other states explicitly based their PDMP mandates on the Kentucky policy or they just adopted
best practices, the subsequent legislation followed Kentucky's model, and we expect that if more states implement man-
dates, they will look like Kentucky's. Our one-state case study also has an advantage compared to studies that use data
on all states. Such studies define the “treatment group” based on multiple states with policies of varying strength
(e.g., Buchmueller & Carey, 2018). The average effects estimated using such an approach may not correspond directly
to specific policies that states are considering.
A second threat to external validity is special circumstances that would affect replicability. As we have noted, the
legislation that established the PDMP mandate also introduced new regulations governing pain clinics, raising the pos-
sibility that our results represent the combined effect of these two reforms. Although it is not possible to precisely disen-
tangle the separate effects of these two policies, several patterns we observe suggest that our results are not merely the
effect of the pain clinic law. First, the overall prescribing reductions in Kentucky are the same or greater if we exclude
the pain management specialists most likely to be affected by the pain clinic closures. Second, if opioid prescriptions fell
because of pain clinic closures, we would expect to see a significant reduction in the number of high-volume providers
writing any opioid prescriptions in Kentucky relative to Indiana. We do see a policy effect on the extensive margin, but
it is low-volume providers who “exit the market." The largest effects we find are on the number of patients to whom
opioid prescriptions are written. Again, if this effect was driven by stricter pain clinic laws it would be concentrated
among the highest volume providers, as Rutkow et al. (2015) find in an analysis of Florida pain clinic closures. Yet, for
this outcome, we find roughly comparable effects for all but the lowest volume providers.
Our analysis also has limitations that have possible implications for internal validity. With any analysis using a
difference-in-differences research design, the internal validity of the results depends on whether the “control group”
represents a plausible counterfactual. It is standard practice to assess the plausibility of this assumption by testing for
parallel trends in the period before the policy went into effect. If outcomes trended similarly in treatment and control
states during the pre-period, the assumption that control states are a good counterfactual is more plausible. Because we
have limited PDMP data prior to the implementation of Kentucky's mandate, we cannot assess pre-trends in that data.
However, we are able to assess pre-trends using other state-level data. The results are generally supportive of the paral-
lel trends assumption. Moreover, the fact that the two states are so similar not only in terms of prescribing
TABLE 8 Change in number of patients seen by a provider by patient type




Total effect in levels −9.483** −1.689** −5.523** −2.584**
(0.510) (0.127) (0.334) (0.0905)
Implied effect in percent −19.4 −12.2 −17.1 −33.9
Note. Single-use patients defined as patients who receive one prescription in current period and none in next period. Multiple-use shoppers
defined as patients who fill a prescription from 3+ providers or at 3+ dispensaries in a quarter. Remaining patients are multiple-use
non-shoppers. Estimates based on a two-part model combining a linear probability model of any prescribing to the patient type with an ordi-
nary least squares regression of the log number of patients of the given type. For ease of interpretation, the combined effect is reported in
both percentage change and levels. All regressions include provider fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications,
which are sampled with replacement at the provider level.
∗∗p<0.01.
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characteristics right before Kentucky's mandate but also in terms of demographic and economic characteristics provides
further support for the use of Indiana as a control group.
6 | CONCLUSION
PDMPs have the potential to decrease inappropriate prescribing of opioids. But PDMPs will only be effective if health care
providers access the data. In an effort to increase provider engagement, several states have recently enacted policies requiring
providers to query the state's PDMP before prescribing opioids. This paper evaluates the first comprehensive PDMP
mandatory access policy, which was enacted by Kentucky in 2012. We find that providers responded to this policy in
two main ways. Some, who prescribed low volumes of opioids before the policy went into effect, stopped prescribing the
drugs altogether. This is consistent with the idea that the policy introduced fixed compliance costs that low-volume
providers were not willing to bear. Higher volume providers continued to prescribe but wrote prescriptions to fewer patients.
We also assess what types of patients were affected. Ideally, PDMP data will help providers identify doctor shoppers
and other high risk patients. Our results suggest that providers reduced prescriptions to patients whose prescription his-
tories suggest possible doctor or pharmacy shopping. We find large reductions (in percentage terms) in the number of
such patients receiving opioid prescriptions. At the same time, we find economically significant reductions in the num-
ber of patients without suspicious prescribing histories. These decreases suggest there may also be patients with a clini-
cally justified need for pain relief who lose access to treatment as a result of the policy.
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